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Blockchain technology and IP – investigating benefits and acceptance in governments
and legislations
Jean-Maxime Rivière
Technische Universität München
Abstract
The blockchain, as underlying technology of Bitcoins, has implications that reach far beyond the original intent as virtual
currency. In this paper, we investigate how blockchain technology can be encompassed in the innovation process and bring
huge benefits to the patent system as well as copyrights, trade secrecy, defensive publications, and open innovation. We
further explore the institutional support for the technology necessary for a successful implementation, in form of legislations
and governmental projects. We find out that numerous authorities have started voting favorable legislations and recognizing
the technology as a valid public ledger. Ultimately, we confirm our findings by interviewing three actors involved in the
innovation process.
Keywords: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Intellectual property, Legislation, Innovation
1. Introduction
“Virtually all of the economic growth that has occurred
since the eighteenth century is ultimately attributable to in-
novation.” (Baumol (2002)), and innovation is the “basis
for progress and evolution in all areas of human endeavor”
(Granstrand (2003)). It is, therefore, critical for a society
to promote innovations. The challenge lies in the creation
of an institutional system incentivizing creators and innova-
tors sufficiently while guaranteeing that the community also
benefits from their efforts as a whole. Grandstand notes that
there are various institutional means to encourage innova-
tion, in the form of social recognition and of monetary re-
wards. Today, however, many of these methods are subject
to issues and demonstrate inadequacies regarding modern
developments, failing to provide an appropriate framework
to encourage and support innovations. In this context, the
rise of the distributed, resilient and transparent blockchain
technology could potentially have huge beneficial impacts.
The technology being in its early phase, with only few under-
standing its underlying mechanics and many wary of its trust-
worthiness, its success will depend on many factors, among
which governmental and legislative support could play a cen-
tral role. Which benefits can be expected from blockchain
technology, and what measures are taken by governments
and legislators to foster its acceptance? In this paper, we ex-
plore the question by introducing the intellectual property
system and the possible strategies it provides for companies.
Next, we investigate the problems and inefficiencies related
with this, summarizing the actual state of discussion. Sub-
sequently, we introduce blockchain technology with the ex-
ample of Bitcoin and inspect its potential use. Afterward, we
summarize all governmental and legislative initiatives which
are fostering the acceptance and trust necessary for the tech-
nology’s success. Finally, we will discuss these findings with
the help of interviews designed to compare the theory with
practical experience.
2. Intellectual property and its limits
2.1. The intellectual property rights system
One of the oldest institutional incentivizing systems is the
intellectual property rights (IPRs) system. Broadly speaking,
intellectual property refers to “unique, value-adding cre-
ations of the human intellect that result from human inge-
nuity, creativity, and inventiveness.“ (Kalanje (2006)). The
central objective of intellectual property laws is to “promote
progress [. . . ] by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries” (U.S Cons). In other words, innovators
are granted a right by the government to exclude others
from using the innovation commercially. In exchange for
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this monopoly, the invention must be made public, allow-
ing society to benefit from the innovation, too. After the
protection expires, the invention can be used, built on and
improved. Intellectual property takes many forms such as
patents, trademarks, trade secrets, copyrights and design
rights, which despite the common term form a highly het-
erogeneous set with differing prerequisites and associated
rights.
2.2. Intellectual property and innovation strategies
In addition to the strategic options directly derived from
the actual property rights, such as patent applications, de-
sign or trademark registration and copyrights, several other
complementary or alternative strategies exist for innovators
in the context of IP and innovation.
2.2.1. Trade secrets
A straightforward approach is secrecy. This method can
be motivated by various factors: the innovation may not ful-
fill the requirements to be patentable or the innovator may
want to avoid making the invention public, which is one of
the requirements for a patent grant. Another reason can be
the will to circumvent the “considerable monetary and op-
portunity costs” (Henkel et al. (2008)) related to patenting.
In some technological fields characterized by numerous in-
cremental inventions, for example, it may not be possible to
patent every step of the process, making the patent system
ineffective in this kind of context. An ideal candidate for se-
crecy is an invention that involves a high degree of complex-
ity and a low chance of being discovered independently by
a competitor (Barrett (2002)), but an independent invention
can never be excluded. The main risk, hence, comes from a
competitor inventing the same technology and choosing to
patent his invention. Since most patent systems are based
on first-to-file and not first-to-invent concepts, this can lead
to litigations through the patentee holding the rights to the
similar technology, essentially making the secretive innovator
an infringer and legally barring him from using his invention.
Fortunately, the patent legislations in many countries includ-
ing members of the European Union, Japan, Canada, Aus-
tralia as well as the United States contain a defense to patent
infringement based on earlier invention and use, also known
as “prior use defense” (Kappos and Rea (2012)). To qualify
for a prior use defense, a few requirements must be met, re-
stricting the use of prior use defense to qualifying prior use
activities by a qualifying prior user in a qualifying time period
at qualifying locations (Kappos and Rea (2012)). Kappos and
Rea compared the requirements in different countries: Qual-
ifying prior use activities range from prior commercial use
to mere possession of the invention, with many of the stud-
ied countries applying a hybrid approach. The preparatory
works for the utilization of an invention are also a qualify-
ing activity in many legislations (World Intellectual Property
Organization, 2014). In most countries, a qualifying prior
user can be anyone who acquired the invention before the
patent application filing date in good faith, with the excep-
tion of Russia, whose law requires the prior user to be the
inventor. The third requirement, the time of prior use, is also
consistent in most countries: prior use must take place before
the earliest date of patent application filing. In the United
States, the prior use must precede the application by at least
one year. Finally, most countries stipulate that the prior use
must take place inside of each respective national border to
be valid. If these criteria are met, the prior user has a right to
the continuation of the exploitation of the invention, as long
as the scope of the activity is not extended. Even though
the effect of prior use defense on innovation is not well re-
searched, Shapiro (2006) noted that “awarding one inventor
a patent and the other the right to use the invention has very
attractive properties.” He concluded that competition as well
as innovation benefit from such laws. Maurer and Scotchmer
(2002) add that “the independent invention defence reduces
entry into the race, and thus reduces wasteful duplication.”
2.2.2. Defensive publication
Another approach is defensive publication. It can be con-
sidered when the invention does not qualify for secrecy, for
example: if the invention is self-evident and can easily be re-
verse engineered, and if the costs of patenting outweigh the
benefits. Another reason can be identified in the risks asso-
ciated with trade secrecy, such as involuntary leaks (Mans-
field (1985)). As the name suggests, the strategy consists
of disclosing the details of an invention, effectively making it
publicly available. One of the main requirements for a patent
grant on an invention is that the invention must be new since
the objective of the patent system is to promote progress. To
verify if an invention is new, it is measured against the prior
art publicly available. The prior art contains all information
which was made public at anytime, anywhere and in any way
before the patent application. Defensive publications hence
qualify as prior art and render it impossible for competitors
(as well as the original owner of the intellectual property) to
get a patent on the published invention. Here again, timeli-
ness plays a central role: for example, legislations in individ-
ual countries such as USA, Australia, South Korea, Canada
and a few others specify a year-long grace period. In effect,
a publication only counts as prior art if it was published 12
months before the invention. It can prove to be a serious
challenge to ascertain whether a disclosure has been avail-
able for more than a year. The capability to undoubtedly
prove the exact time of publication can be the decisive el-
ement settling a lawsuit – or invalidating a patent. Theoret-
ically, defensive publications bear massive potential: for the
inventor, it guarantees freedom to operate, identified as “the
fundamental precondition for appropriation [of value from
inventive activity]” by Henkel et al. (2008). Furthermore,
the entire society benefits as the invention becomes public,
remains unprotected and can thus be used and improved by
everyone.
2.2.3. Open innovation
A radically different approach is called open innovation.
The father of open innovation describes it as “the antithe-
sis of the traditional vertical integration model” (Chesbrough
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(2006)). As he puts it, it is an approach stipulating that firms
can and should use external ideas and combine them with
their own to generate synergies for value creation, and that
internal ideas and developments can be effectively applied
outside of the firm’s market. It hence represents a big step
away from traditional IP management, where progress is pro-
moted by the creation of monopolies and exclusive rights,
giving only one firm the advantage over all others. While
this approach can be beneficially combined with legal exclu-
sion rights, in which case the firm gives up secrecy without
waiving its rights on the published information (Arora et al.
(2001)), open innovation can be even more valuable when
legal protection is abandoned (Chesbrough and Appleyard
(2007)), what Henkel (2006) calls “selective revealing”. In
that case, a firm may choose to make its technology publicly
available to foster collaboration but without any guarantees
to obtain it. A recent example that received much atten-
tion is the electric car maker Tesla releasing all its patents
to the public. In a blog post called “All our patents are be-
long to you” published in 2014, CEO Elon Musk, “in the spirit
of the open source movement”, declares that “Tesla will not
initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith,
wants to use [their] technology1.” He describes patents as
tools slowing down progress and reinforcing monopoly posi-
tions of large enterprises. Despite the altruistic justification
of the decision, others were quick to point out the poten-
tial benefits that could flow out of this decision in favor of
Tesla: higher share in the market for fast charging standard,
increased demand for batteries (of which Tesla is a major pro-
ducer), more efficient partnerships with companies building
on top of Tesla technology and attraction of high perform-
ing employees thanks to the positive image of the company
(Musille (2015)).
2.3. Problems of today’s IP system
Despite the objectives mentioned above and the theo-
retical advantages of IP rights and strategies, the system is
plagued by several problems, ambiguities, and disadvan-
tages.
2.3.1. The internet and copyrights
Works covered by copyrights “range from books, mu-
sic, paintings, sculpture, and films, to computer programs,
databases, advertisements, maps, and technical drawings2”,
making them a very pertinent topic for creativity and in-
novation. However, they face the problem that “internet
technology is developing faster than the laws who govern
it3.” Fraud and art forgery can be as easy as “copy and paste”
nowadays (Boucher et al. (2017)). Torrents and streaming
1https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you
retrieved 12.03.2017
2http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/
retrieved 28.03.2017
3https://ucomm.wsu.edu/the-internet-copyright/
retrieved 28.03.2017
made piracy commonplace while legislations struggle to ad-
just. While uploading a copy of copyrighted content on a
website is illegal and punished by law, streaming often is
not. Article 5(1) of the EU Infosoc Directive (2001/29/EC)
stipulates that “[t]emporary acts of reproduction (. . . ) which
are transient or incidental and an integral and essential part
of a technological process (. . . ) shall be exempted from the
reproduction right.” In June 2014, in the context of the Case
C-360/13 Public Relations Consultants Association v News-
paper Licensing Agency Ltd, the Court of Justice of the EU
ruled that any transient copies that are created as a result of
browsing a website fulfill the conditions required for the Arti-
cle 5(1) exception to apply4. Any contrary ruling would have
made web browsing illegal in the EU5, but that decision also
effectively made streaming legal. Copyrights are supposed to
“confer on the author non-economic rights (i.e. moral rights
such as the rights of paternity) and also economic rights
such as the right to get fair remuneration (i.e. copyright
fees) for the use of their work.” (Madiega (2016)) Hence
it is evident that this status quo can be problematic, with
the ruling making it legal to violate both rights conferred
by copyrights. While several lawful services remunerating
artists, such as Netflix and Spotify, are gaining in popular-
ity, the remuneration remains meager. McCandless (2015)
showed that the revenue of an artist on Spotify is 0.0011$
per play. Furthermore, unregulated streaming services stay
vastly popular, with 57.8 billion visits to streaming sites in
2015, according to MUSO’s 2016 Global Film & TV Piracy
Market Insight Report. The copyright system is in arrears.
2.3.2. The patent system
Boucher et al. (2017) summarize many well-known prob-
lems of the patent system. Competitors can sometimes ex-
ploit the inventions (which must be made public at least 18
months after the patent application) before the innovator be-
cause the patent was not strong enough or because he was
not capable of defending the patent against infringements.
Coupled with the high costs that can be occurred by related
attorney fees and patent searches (which can amount to more
than $20.000 according to Quinn (2015), this can prompt a
lot of innovators to avoid the patent system altogether. An-
other problem identified by Boucher et al. is the complexity
of the patent systems. There is no unified patent system, and
legislations can differ significantly between countries. One
relevant example is the grace period, mentioned above, that
does not exist in most European patent laws (it was removed
from the German legislation in 1968). A worldwide patent
protection is virtually impossible to achieve, be it merely on
account of the associated costs which can be estimated to
$1.000.000 for filing and issuance in each country and an-
other $1.000.000 to maintain the patent to its full term, per
Marks (2016). Furthermore, a raising issue is the emergence
4http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-360/13
retrieved 28.03.2017
5http://copyright4creativity.eu
retrieved 15.03.2017
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of “patent trolls”. Patent trolls are defined as “companies that
obtain the rights to one or more patents in order to profit by
means of licensing and litigation, rather than by producing
their own goods and services”6. These non-practicing enti-
ties (NPE) highjack the original objective of the patent sys-
tem of promoting progress by not only failing to use them to
innovate, but also by preventing others to do so. According
to Muller (2015), 90% of high-tech patent suits in the first
half of 2015 were filed by non-practicing entities. Even when
their claims do not necessarily hold firm legal grounds, many
innovators accused of infringement prefer to settle out of
court due to lack of necessary funds to cover legal expenses,
with median costs of $650.000 for a $1.000.000 claim ac-
cording to the 2011 Report of the Economic Survey from
the American Intellectual Property Law Association7. While
the European competition authorities are reportedly “inves-
tigating high-tech companies to make sure they do not abuse
their rights, granted through patents, to disrupt fair competi-
tion” (Madiega (2016)), no tangible decision has been taken
by any European institution on the matter. Meanwhile, in
the United States, the H.R.9 Innovation Act was introduced
February 5, 2015 by Rep. Goodlatte with the goal of creating
additional requirements as part of the legal process associ-
ated with patent infringement in the United States, but was
never enacted8. U.S. Sen. Leahy (2014) commented on a
previous introduction of the Innovation Act that “there has
been no agreement on how to combat the scourge of patent
trolls on our economy without burdening the companies and
universities who rely on the patent system every day to pro-
tect their inventions.“
One possible way to defend against patent trolls is the
prior use defense, but it is apparent this defense is not op-
timal, either. In the United States for instance, despite the
America Invent Act, enacted end of 2011, “significantly ex-
panding the scope of the prior use rights defense”, the prior
use defense remained mostly unused four years later (Nixon
(2015)). Only three cases were reported in which the de-
fense was used. Among the different possible reasons for this
unpopularity, the defendant’s “additional burden of showing
its commercialization of the invention at least one year be-
fore the filing date of the patent” (Kim (2012)) is brought
forward: “As the burden of proof for establishing the prior
user rights defense falls on the prior user who is asserting
the defense, by clear and convincing evidence, it may require
more effort and increased record keeping on the part of the
prior user to assert this defense.” (Kim (2012)) Despite the
record number of patent litigation cases generated by patent
trolls, for which the prior use defense appears like one of the
most straightforward defenses, companies are reluctant to
use it to their advantage. With no reliable and simple way of
6https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/patent_troll
retrieved 21.03.2017
7http://www.patentinsuranceonline.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/AIPLA-2015-Report-of-the-Economic-Survey.pdf
retrieved 21.03.2017
8https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr9/
retrieved 21.03.2017
proving the exact time and instances of use (in this context,
“laboratory notebooks often play a central role, but are very
problematic both in terms of completeness and of reliability”
(Henkel et al. (2008))) the risk associated with the burden
of proof might deter the companies.
2.3.3. Defensive Publication: no reliable platform
A defensive publication should ideally serve two pur-
poses. Firstly, it should guarantee the publisher’s freedom to
operate by preventing any competitor to get a patent on the
invention. Secondly, by being public, it should benefit society
by enriching its scientific and technological knowledge base.
A defensive publication must, therefore, fulfill certain criteria
to reach these goals effectively. The most critical criteria are:
form (the publication should be as complete as possible for
others to understand and use it), accessibility (in particular,
it should be published somewhere accessible by competitors
in the same field, as well as the patent office), unambiguous
publication date (especially relevant due to the grace period
legislations) as well as proof of existence (it is not sufficient
for a document to be published at a certain point, it must
stay published reliably). Most private places of publication
fail to guarantee most of these requirements. A company’s
website, for example, may be accessible by competitors, but
won’t necessarily be searched by the patent office during the
prior art research, does not have an unambiguous publica-
tion date, since it can be edited, and there’s no way to prove
the document was always accessible since its publication (or
remained the same). A workaround for the last two criteria
used by the patent office is the “Internet Archive: Wayback
Machine9”, a non-profit digital library that relies on dona-
tions to save “snapshots” of the current states of websites
since 1996. It is a very rudimentary and unreliable method
that potentially disadvantages everybody involved. For some
time, IBM offered a suitable solution: the IBM Technical Dis-
closure Bulletin started in 1958 as a proprietary platform on
which IBM published every invention they did not want to
patent. It soon became a go-to platform for many innovators
who wanted to publish their inventions, for those seeking ac-
cess to technical details of published inventions as well as for
patent office personnel in search of prior art. According to
the Delphion (2006), the bulletin has been cited over 48.000
times in various U.S. patents. IBM abandoned the bulletin
by 1998. Since then, the only alternative worth mentioning
is the platform IP.com, which describes itself as the “first and
largest online prior art disclosure service and the only one
publicly available, searchable by patent examiners, inven-
tors, and patent attorneys [. . . ] around the world” (Intellec-
tual Property Software). The organization also claims that
since 2005, there have been 338 patent rejections as a result
of prior art found in their database by examiners. While the
platform seems to guarantee freedom to operate to those
using it to publish inventions, its biggest drawback lies in the
9https://archive.org/web/
retrieved 17.03.2017
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fee required to access any publication, of which the entirety
goes to IP.com and not to the inventor. This feature highly
hinders the second aspect of defensive publication, public
benefit. Furthermore, the platform is privately and centrally
controlled and therefore censorable, since each publication
must be accepted by IP.com individually, and vulnerable to
tampering and loss of data.
2.3.4. Open innovation: lack of coordination, ethics, and
structure
Open innovation is still considered by many as an uncer-
tain and risky business. Two major concerns are the lack of
coordination among disparate groups of people and trust is-
sues midst actors that did not engage in sufficiently frequent
and repeated interactions (Filippi, as cited by Bollier (2015)).
The free rider problem and tragedy of the commons quickly
arise and tarnish the optimistic vision of a mutually benefi-
cial cooperation. Why share a technology when one can ben-
efit from everyone else for free, in all impunity? This risk
causes demotivation, ineffectiveness, and inertia (Alliance
for the open innovation, as cited by Seulliet (2016)). Com-
petition between individuals is a natural phenomenon, and
“collective intelligence and cooperation are not easy to bring
about” without a system “for recognizing individual contrib-
utors” (Seulliet (2016)). In that sense, even though open in-
novation is an approach that aims to bypass the centralized
and institutionalized IP system approach, it still lacks a basic
structure to make it effective. Furthermore, ethical problems
arise when firms engage in open innovation by involving the
community for free. In her book Le travail du consomma-
teur, Dujarier (2014, as cited by Seuillet) pointed out how
this “phenomenon of pseudo co-creation results in an up-
take of the value created by individuals.” Seuillet takes the
example of recent discussions about the unfair distribution
of value among stakeholders involved in the Uber platform,
whose drivers’ operating conditions sparked controversies.
3. The potential of Bitcoin and the Blockchain Techno-
logy
3.1. Introduction to Bitcoin
Even though the most relevant part of Bitcoin in the IP
context is the underlying blockchain technology, it is critical
to understand the profound connection between the Bitcoin
currency and the technology, as Ølnes (2016) put forward.
“One cannot exist without the other.” Even though, as we
will see, the blockchain technology has various usages that
transcend the original intent, such as in IP management, the
currency represents a central element in the safeguarding of
the entire system‘s security and functioning.
3.2. Historical context
Bitcoins were unveiled in the white paper “Bitcoin: A
peer-to-peer electronic cash system”, published in 2008 on
the cryptography mailing list at metzdowd.com by an anony-
mous person or group of persons under the pseudonym
Satoshi Nakamoto. Nakamoto (2008) mentions the two-fold
problem of today’s e-commerce’s exclusive reliance on fi-
nancial institutions, serving as middlemen for transactions,
as motivation for the development of Bitcoins: firstly, it is
a model reliant on trust in intermediaries, and secondly,
intermediaries raise the cost of transactions.
The most relevant issue at the heart of Bitcoins is the
trustworthiness of said intermediaries, on which we will fo-
cus. In 2008, during the financial crisis, the traditional world
banking system almost collapsed and had to be rescued by
governments (Guadamuz and Marsden (2015)). After banks
had begun selling worthless loans (subprimes), governments
bailed the bankrupted banks out by printing money, creating
inflation and effectively stripping the population of the value
of its savings, while most victims of the crisis were left to their
own devices. Bollier (2015) highlights that even the trust-
worthiness of “reputable” third-party guarantors such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission, rating agencies and
other oversight authorities can be problematic: “Who guards
the guards?”. Today, 9 years later, the U.S. federal bank an-
nounced that 15 billion new dollars would be printed and
put into circulation per month in 201710, in addition to those
replacing old notes, raising the inflation back to 2,5% in Jan-
uary 201711.
3.2.1. Broad technical explanation
The reason a central institution is needed in the tra-
ditional online transaction system is the so-called double-
spending problem: as opposed to physical cash, virtual
money can be duplicated, and without anyone keeping track
of the transactions, anybody could pay multiple receivers
the same money, hence the intermediaries in the traditional
arrangement who check every transaction. Despite several
proposals for alternative e- money, no sound method had
been found to solve this central difficulty, until Nakamoto
presented a “solution to the double-spending problem using
a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate com-
putational proof of the chronological order of transactions.”
The first of Bitcoin’s aspects that is important to under-
stand, despite what the name suggests, is that there exists
no actual Bitcoin “coin”, just “unspent transaction outputs”
(Narayanan et al. (2016)). Each actor in the ecosystem has
a private key (usually a 256-bit number). Private keys are
unique, unforgeable and are each associated with a public
key, that can be distributed. This public key can be used to
verify if a transaction has been signed with the associated pri-
vate key and hence “identifies” every actor in the system. In
other words, anyone with actor B’s public key can verify if B
was the one who signed the transaction but only B can sign
it (with his private key). A coin is consequently defined as a
“chain of digital signatures” (Nakamoto (2008)). Each owner
can transfer a coin by digitally signing a previous transaction
10federalreserve.gov
retrieved 10.03.2017
11tradingeconomics.com
retrieved 10.03.2017
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he received (with his public key as recipient) and the public
key of the next owner, and adding this information to the end
of the coin. Each payee can verify the chain of ownership by
checking the signatures.
While this defines what bitcoins are and how transactions
are processed, this approach alone does not solve the double
spending issue: a previous owner could have signed an ear-
lier transaction, spending the received output. The problem
is solved by the innovative blockchain structure introduced
by Nakamoto.
Each transaction is publicly broadcasted on the bitcoin
network, a peer-to-peer network composed of nodes. New
transactions are grouped into blocks, which in turn are again
publicly distributed with a timestamp that proves the data
has existed at a certain time. Each timestamp includes the
timestamp of the previous block as well as a reference to it,
forming a chain of blocks, each one reinforcing the validity
of the one before. This creates a single chronological history
of all transactions in the order in which the network received
them. A transaction is only accepted if the owner did not al-
ready spend the output in a previous transaction saved in the
blockchain. This theoretically provides a solution to double-
spending, but a malevolent entity could still hypothetically
alter the blocks retroactively.
The bitcoin ecosystem uses a proof-of-work (PoW) ap-
proach to make the blockchain tamperproof and therefore
guarantee its validity. As explained by Nakamoto, PoW in-
volves “scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with
SHA-256 [a hashing function developed by the NSA], the
hash begins with a certain number of zero bits [bits equal
to zero].” A hashing function is a function that converts any
input of any length into a unique output of fixed length (64
bits in the case of SHA-256). The main specifications of such
a function are that small alterations in the input lead to big
changes in the output, two different inputs never produce the
same output, and it is impossible to reverse the function: for
a given output, the original input cannot be computed. In
the case of PoW, this means that the only way to satisfy the
required number of zero bits in the output is brute force: try-
ing millions of inputs until one is found, called nonce, that
produces a fitting output. It, however, remains very simple
to verify if the found nonce is valid. This nonce is a pre-
requisite to creating a block of transactions. The number of
zero bits required, which represents the difficulty of creating
a block, can be adapted depending on what the hash rate is
in the system (in other words, depending on how much to-
tal CPU power is used by the network to try to find a fitting
nonce). In Bitcoin, this number is dynamically adapted so
that a nonce is found and a block is added to the chain ev-
ery 10 minutes on average. Once a block of transactions has
been created with a valid nonce, it is impossible to modify
its content without redoing the work of finding the nonce.
As blocks are added to the chain after the block, the work
necessary to alter the block includes redoing the work for all
subsequent blocks. Moreover, a copy of the chain of blocks is
saved on every node of the network, all agreeing on one sin-
gle public history. In this way, the blockchain is tamperproof,
and consequently, trust is created. Note that the technology
is called trustless because no third-party is required; the trust
lies in the software only (Ølnes (2016)).
The last challenge is motivating participants to search
for a valid nonce: brute force searching requires a lot of
CPU power – as of March 2017, the Bitcoin hash rate is ap-
proximately 3,5 million of Tera-hashes per second, meaning
that every second, 3,5*1018 different hash function inputs
are tested, a number which is exponentially growing. This
activity could lead to an energy consumption equivalent to
Denmark’s by 2020 (Deetman (2016)). Naturally, this kind
of energy consumption has huge costs, but without it, the
entire system would collapse, which is why an incentive is
built into the system, commonly named mining. Each cre-
ated block contains a special transaction with no input and
with an output that points to the public key of the miner.
Since the transaction contains no input, the output coins are
“created” and added to the network. The mechanism is anal-
ogous to gold miners retrieving new gold and adding it to
circulation, hence the name. It is what incentivizes miners to
invest CPU power into mining. The number of new bitcoins
created in each block is programmed to decrease over time
until the total number of bitcoins reaches 21 million. This
way, inflation is avoided.
Finally, it is important to mention that the bitcoin net-
work is permission-less: anyone with an internet connection
can join for free and broadcast their own and other’s trans-
actions across the network. All this makes the blockchain
technology a decentralized public ledger of transactions on a
network that is secure, tamper-proof, timestamped and easily
accessible.
3.3. The potential of Bitcoin in the IP system
As Swan (2015) points out, the technology behind the
cryptocurrency provides two key functions which can be ap-
plied and are highly useful in the IP system: hashing and
secure timestamping. As explained, the hashing algorithm
outputs a short string for any input. Since, per definition,
the algorithm is collision-free, meaning no two different in-
puts can produce the same output, the input can be uniquely
and unequivocally identified by its hash. Since the hash func-
tion is not back-computable, the file remains private, but ev-
ery document, genome file, video or any other format can
this way be compressed enough to be included in a bitcoin
transaction, giving it the additional benefit of the system’s
incorruptible timestamp. Since a document’s hash can eas-
ily be computed by running the hash algorithm, the times-
tamped hash can be compared with the hash of any docu-
ment to prove that this document existed then, essentially
creating an unambiguous proof of existence. Combined with
the other characteristics of the blockchain such as low trans-
action costs (49.720 satoshi ($0,48) for the median trans-
action12), the blockchain’s decentralized and distributed na-
12https://bitcoinfees.21.co
retrieved 19.03.2017
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ture, its reliance on mathematics instead of trust, its im-
mutability as well as its transparency (with every transaction
and content of transaction publicly available), the technology
creates a permanent and public way to cost-efficiently record
information and to prove its existence.
Another highly promising aspect of the blockchain is
the smart contract concept. Smart contracts are technically
enforced on the blockchain instead of the traditional legal
enforcement by laws or courts of arbitration (Narayanan
et al. (2016)). They define the rules and penalties around an
agreement and automatically enforce those obligations. Note
that the Bitcoin system is not the most powerful environment
in that regard and other blockchains introduced later, such as
Ethereum, provide better support for it. This paper, even if
it focuses on Bitcoin as the most robust and secure platform,
doesn’t exclude the potential of other blockchains. Ethereum,
being Turing-complete, makes it possible to specify any func-
tionality specifiable on any other computer (Narayanan et al.
(2016)), making the range of use cases in IP and beyond
virtually unlimited.
3.4. Tangible use cases in IP
3.4.1. Copyrights
Blockchain technology can help creators capture the
value they create by introducing the concepts of authen-
ticity, condition, and ownership until then missing online
(Tapscott D. (2016)). The Berlin-based startup Ascribe13 lets
artists “lock in attribution, securely share and track where
[the] digital work spreads”, solving the copyright version
of the double spending problem. Promising solutions have
started emerging in the troubled music industry, as well:
the dotBlockchain project aims to replace traditional music
formats such as MP3 and WAV with a new format (.dc) incor-
porating minimum viable data, which is metadata about who
owns the song, who has the right to sell it, to play it, among
others. This information would be stored on the blockchain
and could be combined with smart contracts, offering func-
tionalities such as restricting playback to legitimate own-
ers only, or executing royalties and licensing agreements
in real time. Boucher et al. (2017) advocate the view that
blockchain development in the copyright area could lead to
“multi-territorial licensing policies and enhanced legal cer-
tainty for creators and purchasers while providing effective
dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly in relation to
tariffs, licensing conditions, entrustment of online rights for
management and withdrawal of online rights”, rebalanc-
ing the rights between creators, buyers and intermediaries,
giving copyrights their original purpose back.
3.4.2. Blockchain in the patent system
“Deploying blockchain technology within the patent sys-
tem could reduce inefficiencies in recording and agreeing
the time of registrations in an efficient way, perhaps across
13https://www.ascribe.io/
retrieved 19.03.2017
several national patent systems” (Boucher et al. (2017)).
Boucher et al. suggest that blockchain registration could
be the first step in the patent application, providing proof
of existence right from the beginning. The entire process
could be built on top, providing a streamlined and trans-
parent practice limiting inefficiencies, paperwork as well as
potential corruption. More importantly, the technology could
prove to be an effective tool to fight patent trolls, by offering
companies a cheap and easy way to timestamp and create a
trail of records for their inventions and trade secrets. These
blockchain certificates could then be used to defend against
litigating NPEs as notarized arguments proving existence,
ownership, and integrity for the prior use defense. Munich-
based startup Bernstein14 recently launched a pilot test to
investigate this possibility. Hancock and Vaizey, in their
report Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond blockchain
(2015) even envision companies registering their IP within a
distributed ledger, skipping the traditional patent application
altogether. According to their report, this could reduce the
total number of contract disputes, which make up 57% of lit-
igation in the UK. Moreover, this could have substantial cost
benefits by reducing the number of complex interactions with
local and national governments. One decentralized ledger
would also solve the problem of unifying the patent system
across countries. This could vastly improve the effectiveness
of IP management, speed up the innovation process in com-
panies and foster the distribution of information across them
through the ledger.
While the case they make is highly satisfying, it could be
regarded as overly optimistic, as well as oversimplifying. The
patent system’s goal is not only to timestamp and publish in-
ventions. One central role of patent examiners is to assess the
novelty of the inventions, a responsibility that builds on mas-
sive databases and requires a systematic research of all prior
art. This meticulousness sets a very high standard for new
inventions, pushing companies who want to register IP to be
highly precise and innovative. Patent examiners are abso-
lute experts in their field, can be a great source of knowledge
for anyone requesting a prior art report and with their legal
background are the most qualified to settle disputes. Conse-
quently, while blockchain technology certainly has great po-
tential to improve a system that has not evolved as fast as the
setting in which it operates, it is highly disputable whether it
could replace it altogether.
3.4.3. A new platform for defensive publications
One project published on the Open Ecosystem Network,
called Smart Defensive Publishing, proposes the “creation of
a disclosure service based on the bitcoin blockchain and the
Interplanetary File System15” (IPFS). IPFS is a publicly dis-
tributed version of the web providing several advantages for
a defensive publication platform: each file is given a unique
14https://www.bernstein.io/
retrieved 20.03.2017
15https://www.open-ecosystem.org/projects/smart-defensive-publishing
retrieved 27.03.2017
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fingerprint, duplications are removed, the platform supports
versioning, each network node can choose which content it is
hosting, and the database is indexed and searchable16. Com-
bined with the benefits of the blockchain’s timestamping and
proof of existence, the platform could offer a decentralized
way to cost-efficiently publish in an uncensored manner and
guarantee the accessibility to all documents at any time by
anyone, providing an ideal source of prior art. The database
could then easily be replicated for specific uses and indexing
structure, for example by patent offices.
3.4.4. Open innovation through the blockchain
“Today, traditional issues related to shared common-pool
resources—such as the free rider problem or the tragedy of
the commons—could be addressed with the implementation
of blockchain-based governance, through the adoption of
transparent decision-making procedures and the introduc-
tion of decentralized incentives systems for collaboration
and cooperation” (Filippi, as cited by Bollier (2015)). Com-
munities of companies wishing to engage in open innova-
tion could implement “innovative forms of self-governance”
thanks to the “transparent and decentralized nature of the
blockchain” (ibid). With every interaction recorded and pub-
licly available on a distributed ledger, a set of indisputable
rules could be enforced independently and automatically
through smart contracts linking specific interactions to trans-
actions. The blockchain does not only allow for transactions
of currency, and by registering assets, property effectively
becomes a “smart asset” (Walport (2016)), which is times-
tamped, uniquely identifiable, traceable, linked to the owner,
and can be efficiently traded across the system. This pro-
vides the grounds for a “new sophisticated incentive system,
which might significantly differ from traditional market-
based mechanisms” (Filippi, as cited by Bollier (2015)),
by creating a healthy competition among individuals with
genuine recognition of each contribution (Seulliet (2016)).
Seuillet emphasizes the need for such a recognition since
some innovators are always more creative and inventive than
others, and eventually emerge as leaders because of their vi-
sion and drive (the so-called “lead users”). The blockchain
could provide the effective incentives already used in the
patent system, namely non-monetary rewards such as recog-
nition, thanks to strong ownership and traceability of ideas
and inventions, as well as monetary incentives, automat-
ically enforced through smart contracts. The blockchain
further allows the measurement of peer exchange, “even
when they take place in a gift / counter-gift logic” (Seulliet
(2016)). To summarize, “by allowing stigmergy processes,
[the blockchain approach to open innovation] aims to mobi-
lize collective intelligence, introduce a spirit of sharing, pool
the contributions of community members, and generate a
more natural, fair and motivating cooperation. By managing
the individual reputations of the members of a community,
16https://ipfs.io/
retrieved 27.03.2017
blockchain also creates healthy competition between co-
creators. Finally, by linking the principle of coopetition to
open innovation, it creates a new paradigm, making this open
innovation more efficient, productive, and ethical” (Seulliet
(2016)).
4. Institutional and legislative support of blockchain
technology
4.1. The need for institutional and legislative support of the
blockchain
While it may sound counterintuitive to discuss institu-
tional and legislative support for a technology that has been
created precisely out of distrust in institutions and which by
nature is decentralized and ruled only by the laws of code
and mathematics, we show that, for the moment being, and
at least for most of the intellectual property field, it is a nec-
essary step.
Most countries have started implementing basic legal
principles for bitcoin and other altcoins as currencies: lat-
est was Japan, planning a bill recognizing Bitcoin as a legal
payment method in April 2017 (Helms (2017)). However,
legislators struggle to keep up with the wave of innovative
blockchain use cases, in particular for IP. In this sector, sev-
eral concerns are central to the efficient application of the
technology.
The first is the legal binding of digital signatures used
in blockchains. As pointed out by McMullen (2017), not all
digital signatures are equally valid: there have been cases of
e- signature systems with design and security flaws, which
is why governments have set complex standards. Habitually
a valid signature is required to make contracts legally valid,
a necessary precondition in case of legal disputes. In other
words, for the previously explored potential of smart con-
tracts to be unlocked, private key signatures must be recog-
nized.
The second issue also mentioned by McMullen is the use
of blockchain based evidence in court. The law stipulates
very precise specifications for what is referred to as “admis-
sible evidence”17. Many factors come into play in determin-
ing admissibility, such as relevance and reliability. McMullen
observes that while blockchain evidence can theoretically be
admissible in most legal systems, it necessitates the involve-
ment of an expert explaining the fundamentals of the tech-
nology and asserting its trustworthiness. It is always possible
to prove the reliability of the information since it is mathe-
matically given by the blockchain, but it costs money and
time, which drastically decreases efficiency and counterbal-
ances the many advantages the technology could offer.
Another matter brought forward by McMullen is the need
for legislations to support the implementation of blockchain
technology for copyright protection. As he notes, “copyright
17www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/what-is-admissible-
evidence.html
retrieved 20.03.17
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is based on statute. Real reforms to copyright law have to
come through government action”. Blockchain technology
can help creators track their creations and capture the value
they generate, which is already a significant step forward
compared to today’s situation, but it does not solve the prob-
lem of unauthorized use: to remove infringing content, they
must fall back on legal means (Horbal, as cited by Bitcoin
Magazine, 2016).
4.2. Research methodology
There are two ways in which legislations and govern-
ments can support the realization of the blockchain potential
in the IP system.
The most straightforward approach is the explicit accep-
tance of the technology in legislations, recognizing it as valid
and fitting for specific use cases. This is, of course, the ideal
form of legal framework in favor of blockchains. This also in-
cludes regulations making the technology admissible without
directly mentioning it.
The other investigated form of governmental support is
of a more implicit nature and is embodied through the spe-
cific use of blockchain technology in government functions.
These instances of implementation provide proofs of concept
showing the government’s recognition of the blockchain as a
valid public record. If proven successful, this could have a
highly beneficial impact on the technology’s image and cred-
ibility, therefore potentially accelerating its implementation
in IP. As explained by Classon (as cited by PYMNTS, 2017)
“the wider adoption of blockchain technology by the govern-
ment has the potential to validate this software for the rest
of the economy and potentially influence how process inter-
actions will flow in and out of government entities, and by
extension, among non-government entities.”
4.3. Support of blockchain technology in legislations
4.3.1. Copyright legislations
To this date, no concrete legislation has been issued by
any country or state which supports the use of blockchain for
improved copyrights management. As observed by McMullen
however, governments are starting to consider the possibili-
ties of IP on the blockchain. The Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Technical Upgrades Special Project Team (Ament
(2015)) of the United States Copyright Office makes “specific
recommendations” for a “better public record”: “One of the
ongoing and primary objectives of the Copyright Office is to
create and maintain a public database of robust, reliable, and
authoritative records of copyright ownership.” Even though
the blockchain is not explicitly mentioned, some central as-
pects of the blockchain can be recognized in those require-
ments. Regarding metadata, the Office might also wish to
seek “solutions to harvest this data and make it available”,
which is also encouraging for new blockchain based formats.
In 2016, both the European Union Intellectual Property
Office (EUIPO) and the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO) organized meetings on the topic of
blockchains. During the Blockchain Technology Workshop in
October 2016, “over 20 leading blockchain specialists from
Europe and the US met in Brussels to discuss the future use
of the technology in the field of IPR18.” They focused on areas
of protection and enforcement, acknowledging the potential
of the technology in “tangible and intangible asset manage-
ment, smart contracting, track and trace of products17”.
Similarly, the Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy
Task Force hosted a meeting December 9 on Developing the
Digital Marketplace for Copyrighted Works at the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia19.
The aim was to “facilitate constructive, cross-industry dia-
logue among stakeholders about ways to promote a more
robust and collaborative digital marketplace for copyrighted
works (ibid).” Notably, members of the teams behind Ascribe
and the dotblockchain music format were invited to partici-
pate and voice their opinion. According to the website, the
background was the identification of several critical issues in
the copyright ecosystem, for which the task force plans to
“conduct further work” including “on the issue of how the
government can facilitate the further development of a ro-
bust online licensing environment.”
This shows how aware and concerned governments are
regarding the copyright situation, and hopefully, this kind of
initiatives will allow for a more rapid development of legis-
lations leveraging the benefits of blockchain technology.
4.3.2. Admissibility of blockchain signatures and data, in
chronological order
Vermont
The US State Vermont took the lead in blockchain legislation
by adopting a bill, signed into effect by Governor P. Shumlin
on June 2, 2016, recognizing blockchain data as valid in the
court system. Bill H868 states that “A digital record electron-
ically registered in a blockchain shall be self-authenticating”
(An act relating to miscellaneous economic development pro-
visions, Nr. 157 § § 1913 Sec. I.1. 12 (2016)). This bill effec-
tively harmonizes blockchain data with Vermont’s state law
on the kinds of evidence admissible in court, giving any data
full legal bearing20. On the one hand, the implications for
the industry are huge, since use cases go beyond IP, such as
authentication of physical objects, which could, in turn, con-
vince other industries to trust the blockchain, leading to fur-
ther democratization of the technology. On the other hand,
this represents a fundamental milestone since it opens the
way for other states and countries to follow, giving them a
starting point to build on. It also “opens the door to further
applications of blockchain within Vermont infrastructure in
the future” (ibid).
18https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel- web/secure/webdav/guest/document
_library/observatory/documents/newsletter/Observatory-newsletter_De
cember2016_en.pdf
retrieved 25.03.2017
19https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/public-
meeting-developing-digital- marketplace-copyrighted-works-dec
retrieved 21.03.2017
20https://dcebrief.com/vermont-breaks-new-ground-in-cryptocurrency-
technology/
retrieved 22.03.2017
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European Union
On July 1st, 2016, the regulatory framework (910/2014/EU)
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July
2014 on “electronic identification and trust services for elec-
tronic transactions in the internal market”21 became effec-
tive. Section 4 Article 25 on the legal effects of electronic
signatures states that:
“1. An electronic signature shall not be denied legal ef-
fect and admissibility as evidence in legal proceedings solely
on the grounds that it is in an electronic form or that it does
not meet the requirements for qualified electronic signatures.
2. A qualified electronic signature shall have the equivalent
legal effect of a handwritten signature. 3. A qualified elec-
tronic signature based on a qualified certificate issued in one
Member State shall be recognised as a qualified electronic
signature in all other Member States. “ While not referenc-
ing the use of blockchain technology directly, the regulation
legally makes all electronic signatures admissible as evidence
in court, therefore including blockchain signatures, poten-
tially giving them the same legal bearing as handwritten sig-
natures. Furthermore, Article 41 of Section 6 makes it im-
possible to deny the legal effect and admissibility of a times-
tamp because it is of an electronic form. Note that none of
the stipulations explicitly grant the blockchain data the title
of “qualified” evidence, which might still make the appeal to
experts necessary in court.
What might be the most important effect is that it au-
tomatically invalidates any inconsistent EU member’s law,
guaranteeing uniform application across the EU (Puterbaugh
(2016)). This law is not a guarantee that blockchain data
will be accepted as valid, but it makes impossible for any Eu-
ropean court to reject the data based on the fact that it is
electronic.
Arizona
Meanwhile, back across the Atlantic, the Arizona House Bill
2417 was introduced in February 2017 and is awaiting the
governor’s signature, after successfully passing the House of
Representatives and the Senate22.
The bill will have several crucial implications for blockchain
users. Article 5A establishes that “a signature that is secured
through blockchain technology is considered to be in an elec-
tronic form and to be an electronic signature.”, effectively
making blockchain signatures admissible under Arizona law.
The bill also recognizes blockchain contracts and records as
admissible, and smart contracts “may not be denied legal
effect, validity, or enforceability”. Lastly, the bill includes
a stipulation about who exactly owns the data included on
the blockchain (Higgins (2017)). It is established that any
person securing information on the blockchain retains the
same rights of ownership and use except if the data was part
of a transaction made to transfer ownership.
21http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.
L_.2014.257.01.0073.01.ENG
retrieved 22.03.2017
22https://legiscan.com/AZ/bill/HB2417/2017
retrieved 22.03.2017
4.4. Support of blockchain technology through government
use cases
4.4.1. The potential of blockchains in governments
“All governments are a fit. [Anyplace where there is a
need for] trusted data repositories is highly conducive to
be blockchain-enabled, creating efficiencies in issuance and
authentication, and making the entire workflow radically
transparent and auditable. Furthermore, states can save
billions of dollars from this type of automation.” (Boring,
founder and president of the Chamber of Digital Commerce,
as cited by PYMNTS, 2017). All advantages of blockchain
technology as a tamperproof, cheap, distributed, public and
transparent infrastructure database make Bitcoin and poten-
tially other blockchains “a promising technology for validat-
ing many types of persistent documents in public sector.”
(Ølnes (2016))
4.4.2. Estonia
The 1.311 million residents strong European country23
is considered a leading nation in blockchain adoption. Its
digital government initiative started in 1997, and in 2001
the government introduced X-Road, a distributed database
giving its citizens access to a wide range of services online,
such as e-identity, residence registration and electronic tax
declaration among others24. In this system, all government
institutions have access to a (permissioned) blockchain ser-
vice to “secure access and audit logs”25. The Ministry of
Justice is using the same blockchain to ensure the integrity
of data such as the “Estonian Property Registry, Business
Registry, Succession Registry, state’s announcements, court
files.”. Furthermore, the same company behind the tech-
nology, Guardtime, has announced a partnership with the
Estonian eHealth Foundation, aiming to provide the health-
care record system with the same data security and integrity
benefits, making it impossible to alter information without
being noticed (Palmer (2016)).
In December 2015, the Estonian government also in-
troduced a public notary service based on the Ethereum
blockchain in partnership with Bitnation, giving Estonian
residents the ability to notarize all kinds of certificates on the
blockchain, such as marriages, birth certificates or business
contracts26. The Estonia’s e-residency program encountered
encouraging success and had countries such as Azerbaijan,
Namibia, and Japan voice their interest to implement the
technology as well (Bershidsky (2015)).
23http://data.worldbank.org/country/estonia
retrieved 23.03.2017
24https://e-estonia.com/component/x-road/
retrieved 23.03.2017
25https://tinyurl.com/guardtime
retrieved 23.03.2017
26https://bitnation.co/blog/pressrelease-estonia-bitnation-public-
notary-partnership/
retrieved 23.03.2017
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4.4.3. Delaware, USA
The Delaware Blockchain Initiative was launched in April
2016 to “embrace the emerging blockchain and smart con-
tract technology industry27” While one of the stated ob-
jectives to create a welcoming regulatory environment for
the development of blockchain applications has yet to pro-
duce any legislations, Governor Markell, who gave rise to
the initiative, has also announced that the state would in-
vestigate own use cases. The startup Symbiont has started
working with the Delaware Public Archives to “store state
archival records on a distributed ledger (ibid)” (the Assem-
bly blockchain, permissioned28). By independently storing
the documents on every node of the network, the company
promises data recovery as well as cost-savings for the state
(Long, as cited by GCN, 2016). The project is furthermore
using smart contracts to “automate compliance with the
state’s document retention and destruction laws” (Tinianow
2017). Starting 2017, companies will also be able to file
documents on the state’s distributed ledger, such as Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) filings, as smart contract versions.
4.4.4. Illinois, USA
Announced during the Blockchain Conference Chicago,
the Illinois Blockchain Initiative is a consortium of private
companies as well as five government agencies: the Depart-
ment of Financial and Professional Regulation, the State De-
partment of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, the De-
partment of Insurance, Cook County’s Recorders of Deeds as
well as the Department of Innovation & Technology (Castillo
(2016)). Schneider, as cited by CoinDesk, stated that two
main goals (similar to Delaware’s) were pursued. Firstly,
Illinois plans on creating a “welcoming regulatory environ-
ment for digital currency and blockchain businesses”. House
Resolution 120 was introduced on February 8, 2017, to cre-
ate a task force investigating the options. As of March 17,
2017, the bill was awaiting the vote of the house of rep-
resentatives29. The second objective is to “develop specific
blockchain prototypes for use by the Illinois government”.
According to Castillo (2017), five government pilots were
unveiled, “one of which is nearing completion”: The Cook
County and Tech Startup Velox Pilot Program to Integrate
Blockchain-Based Real Estate into the Public Record. Sim-
ilarly to bitcoins, the project allows for the tracking of in-
dividual property and its transaction history, yielding the
usual blockchain benefits of transparency, efficiency, and in-
tegrity. Velox is using the Bitcoin blockchain for this project.
The findings of the experiment will be presented during the
March 2017 IBREA conference (Torpey (2016)).
27http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/governor-markell-
launches-delaware-blockchain-initiative-300260672.html
retrieved 23.03.2017
28https://symbiont.io/technology/
retrieved 23.03.2017
29https://legiscan.com/IL/bill/HR0120/2017
retrieved 17.03.2017
4.4.5. Other smart property projects: Sweden and Republic
of Georgia
Very similar experiences are being tested in other coun-
tries. Chavez-Dreyfuss (2016) reports that it currently “takes
months to complete a real estate deal in Sweden from the
time the parties agree until the contract is completed.” To-
gether with ChromaWay, Kairos Future, Telia Company, SBAB
Bank and Landshypotek Bank, the Scandinavian country
is investigating ways to speed up the process and to en-
hance traceability with an implementation on the Bitcoin
blockchain. The project was successfully piloted in a test en-
vironment and will conclude on March 30, 2017, “with the
delivery of a functioning technology platform and a findings
report.”30
Analogous motives have originated a smart registry pilot
project in the Republic of Georgia. Partner Bitfury intends
to “create a private blockchain tailored for property rights
registration that is anchored to the public Bitcoin blockchain”
(Shin (2016)). According to Minister of Justice Tsulukiani,
the technology will be ready for real estate extracts as soon
as 201731.
4.4.6. Russia
The Digital Ecosystem project, currently tested by the
Russian government, was presented on October 13, 2016, at
FINOPOLIS 2016 Innovative Financial Technologies Forum in
Kazan. Deputy Director of the Federal Antimonopoly Service
of Russia (FAS) Tsarikovsky, explains that a blockchain will
be used to transfer communications between the service and
external companies, with the objective of securely decreas-
ing the number of paper documents flowing in and out, and
the hope of therefore reducing manpower, eliminating infor-
mation redundancy and speeding up the process, as well as
increasing transparency32. The blockchain platform used for
the project was not specified, but according to Tsarikovsky,
the system may go live in the first half of 2017 (ibid).
4.4.7. Dubai
The emirate too is investigating blockchain technology
use cases in the government. The Dubai Blockchain Strat-
egy, launched in December 2016 for this intent, builds on
three pillars, which are “Government Efficiency”, “Industry
Creation” and “International Leadership”33. The project aims
to enable a “paperless digital layer for all city transactions
(ibid)“, which could bring the government savings of $1.5
billion, and enable use cases range from visa application to
30http://chromaway.com/landregistry/
retrieved 23.03.2017
31http://cbw.ge/business/georgia-becomes-first-country-register-
property-blockchain/
retrieved 23.03.2017
32http://www.coinfox.info/novosti/6780-russian-regulator-transfers-all-
non-government-paper-flow-to-blockchain
retrieved 23.03.2017
33http://www.smartdubai.ae/dubai_blockchain.php
retrieved 23.03.2017
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bill payments and license renewals, as well as business op-
portunities in real estate, healthcare, fin-tech, and tourism
(ibid). The government did not disclose on which blockchain
the project would be built.
4.4.8. Governments investigating options
While few governments have started implementing the
technology through various pilots, several others are showing
interest. Governments recognize the potential for the tech-
nology and publish reports, resolutions, bills and papers ac-
knowledging it, a potential first step for a later adoption.
In January of 2016, US state Vermont published the
Blockchain technology: opportunities and risks report ac-
knowledging the benefits of the technology while arguing
that “at present, the costs and challenges associated with the
use of blockchain technology for Vermont’s public record-
keeping outweigh the identifiable benefits.34” The European
Parliament Resolution of 26 May 2016 on virtual currencies
“notes that DLT’s [distributed ledger technology] potential
to accelerate, decentralise, automate and standardise data-
driven processes at lower cost has the potential to alter
fundamentally the way in which assets are transferred and
records are kept35” and “further notes that DLT could be
used to increase data sharing, transparency and trust not
only between government and citizens (ibid)”.
On January 25, 2017, the Hawaii House Bill 1481
was introduced, recognizing “the vast potential for this
[blockchain] technology to drastically change and improve
public sector operations36”. The bill aims at establishing a
task force to “examine, educate and promote best practices
for enabling blockchain technology (ibid)”.
Finally, the UK Digital Strategy, a policy paper published
on March 1, 2017, by the UK Secretary of State for Culture,
Media and Sport Bradley, introduces the Digital Catapult,
a center with the goal of finding “new ways to work with
personal data with more control and trust, applications of
blockchain and smart contracts37”
5. Practitioner interviews
5.1. Methodology
For the present study, three interviews were conducted
during March of 2017. The goal was to find out how the
theoretical results of the research measure up against real-
world application and perception. The idea was to create a
small sample spread out as far as possible across the “chain
34http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Legislative-Reports/blockchain-
technology-report-final.pdf
retrieved 25.03.2017
35http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0228+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
retrieved 25.03.2017
36http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2017/bills/HB1481_HD1_.HTM
retrieved 25.03.2017
3737https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-digital-
strategy/uk-digital-strategy
retrieved 25.03.2017
of innovation”, to collect heterogeneous perspectives from
actors with diverging interests. On one end of the chain of
innovation we identified companies, who are the innovating
entities which the IP system aims to incentivize. Jonathan
Woehrstein, the founder of “genetic diagnostics” startup
Deoxy in Munich, was interviewed in that regard. On the
other end of the innovation chain, we identified the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EPO). The patent office embodies the IP
system authority. Its objective is to incentivize innovation by
granting patents for companies, and by publishing them after
a certain amount of time for the public’s benefit. Pia Björk,
director of examiners at the EPO in Munich, was interviewed
accordingly. Lastly, the goal was to interview someone in the
middle of this chain of innovation: Ricardo Cali, a managing
partner of evoIP, a “Munich and Mannheim-based engineer
service provider in the field of intellectual property” (R. Cali,
personal communication, 17.3.2017). Each interviewee was
asked specific questions linked to the theoretical structure
of this thesis. They were questioned about the need for in-
novation and a legal framework to support it, the problems
of today’s IP system, the potential of blockchain technology
to improve the situation, and lastly about the acceptance of
the technology. It was especially important to compare how
blockchain technology was perceived and could improve the
situation for players in different situations, as well as what
they suppose would drive acceptance.
5.2. Analysis
5.2.1. Perceived importance of the IP system
All interviewees agreed on the importance of the IP sys-
tem. Naturally, a large part of the interviews revolved around
the patent system, in particular, due to it being the most im-
portant IP right subsystem. The patent system was identi-
fied as highly necessary, but not all interviewees acknowl-
edged the same benefits. P. Björk (personal communication
17.3.2017) described the patent system as a “way of promot-
ing innovation” through money incentives and as a “source
of information for the public.” Specialized in pharmacology,
she underlined the importance of protecting drug-related in-
ventions, which are long and costly to develop, but easy to
copy. According to her, the money made through patent
monopoly rights is then used for further research, benefiting
both the company and the public. On the company side, J.
Woehrstein (personal communication, 8.3.2017) insisted on
the relevance of patents for small startups: “We need it.” He
described patents as the central value indicator for startups
in the eyes of investors: “If you don’t have patents, nobody
is going to buy you”. R. Cali described the IP system as a
“good method to ensure that the knowledge gets spread” but
also underlined the competitive edge a good IP strategy can
give the company. These findings generally agree with our
theoretical identification of the IP system’s benefits.
5.2.2. Perceived troubles of the IP system
Once again, all interviewees agreed to say today’s IP sys-
tem is not ideal, mainly citing the troubles in the patent
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Table 1: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIONS SUPPORTING BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY (Source: Author’s own research)
Location Legislation Date Effect Status
Vermont (US) HB868 6.2016 Admissibility of blockchain data in court Passed
EU Regulatory
framework
(910/2014/EU)
7.2016 Admissibility of electronic signatures and times-
tamps in European courts
Effective
Arizona (US) HB2417 2.2017 Admissibility of blockchain signatures, smart
contracts and definition of ownership
Awaiting governor’s
signature
Table 2: OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL USE CASES FOR BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY (Source: Author’s own research)
Location Project Date Use Cases Blockchain system
Estonia X-Road 2001-
2017
Secured governmental databases;
Transparent healthcare record sys-
tem; Public notary service
Proprietary (permissioned)
and Ethereum
Delaware
(US)
Delaware Blockchain Ini-
tiative
4.2016 Storage of state archival records;
Document filling with smart con-
tract integration
Assembly (permissioned)
Georgia - 4.2016 Property registry Private blockchain on top
of Bitcoin
Sweden - 6.2016 Property registry Bitcoin
Illinois (US) Illinois Blockchain Initia-
tive
9.2016 Property registry Proprietary structure on
top of Bitcoin
Russia Digital Ecosystem 10.2016 Communication between FAS and
companies
Unknown
Dubai Dubai Blockchain Strategy 12.2016 Paperless city transactions Unknown
system. In compliance with our findings, the problems
cited included the slow and rigid process of patent appli-
cations for companies (J. Woehrstein, personal communi-
cation, 8.3.2017). R. Cali also mentioned the complexity
and cost- intensive structure of the patent system, leading
to inefficiencies and “cash burning”. Both P. Björk and R.
Cali acknowledged the problem of patent trolls. The main
difficulty for the EPO identified by P. Björk was informa-
tion management, in regards to the exponential amount of
information through globalization and to the reliability of
availability and publication date of information published on
the internet.
5.2.3. Perceived potential of blockchain technology in IP
Two of the three interviewees (evoIP and Deoxy) were al-
ready part of the Bernstein pilot project (introduced in chap-
ter 3.3.2) before the interview and chosen accordingly. Their
interest in blockchain technology in the field of IP is there-
fore not necessarily representative of the rest of the industry
since they are part of the small population of early adopters.
It remains interesting to investigate their perception of the
potential of the technology in their fields, especially consid-
ering that early adopters often lead the way for the major-
ity to follow, according to the innovation adoption theory
(Rogers and Shoemaker (1971)). Furthermore, the last in-
terview with the EPO director was conducted independently
of prior links to blockchain projects. All three interviewees
reported perceiving potential for the IP system at different
levels.
Corroborating our thesis, the interviewed company
founder J. Woehrstein saw “critical” importance in the ability
to indisputably prove the time of invention for the case of
patents issues. According to J. Woehrstein, the technology
can function as a highly efficient complement to patents in
highly technological fields, in particular when used in a prior
use defense, considering that many small steps of the inno-
vation patent cannot be patented. He also cited the benefit
of indisputable contribution proof, an argument we brought
forward for open innovation. According to J. Woehrstein,
measurement of involvement in patents remains lackluster,
especially in universities, where old e-mails are supposedly
being used as proof of participation.
R. Cali, whose company is using the technology to offer
its clients a notarization platform for trade secrets and de-
fensive publishing, sees the biggest advantage of blockchain
technology in its affordability, in particular for prior use de-
fense against patent trolls.
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Table 3: OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWS (Source: Author’s own research)
Date Name Position Duration
08.03.2017 Johannes B. Woehrstein Founder of Deoxy Technologies 21:10
17.03.2017 Ricardo Cali Managing director at evoIP 37:00
17.03.2017 Pia Björk Director of examiners at the European Patent Office 34:05
P. Björk admitted she was not aware of possible investi-
gations of the technology taking place at the EPO, but recog-
nizes the “advantage of the date”, since timestamping repre-
sents a central point – and difficulty – in the work of patent
examiners. She affirmed that she could see the EPO use
a publication platform powered by blockchain technology,
saying it “would actually address some of the problems we
have when we search in internet today.” She added that the
EPO was constantly looking for more efficient and secure
databases, with entire departments dedicated to the task. P.
Björk did, however, voice doubts when asked if decentralized
open innovation governed by blockchain technology could
replace the patent system, naming the expert arbitrator func-
tion the patent office provides as the main reason.
5.2.4. Discussion about acceptance of the technology
Each of the interviewees agreed in their opinion that the
implementation of blockchain technology in IP would depend
mainly on its acceptance by the industry. Both J. Woehrstein
and R. Cali expressed serious doubt about the capacity of gov-
ernments in leading the way for the industry, in particular
the German government, deemed as slow to respond and to
adapt to innovations. None of the interviewees had heard
about the legislative and governmental initiatives. Still, all
of them finished on a positive and optimistic note regarding
future acceptance in the system: P. Björk stated that “if it is
used by many, and the content is there, we will also be look-
ing at it.”. To the question “will the adoption in other coun-
tries help?”, R. Cali answered: “I think it will help.” Moreover,
J. Woehrstein, when questioned about the possible admissi-
bility of blockchain data in courts, affirmed that even though
courts are “always a gamble”, he alleged, “I think it’s going
to work”.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a study on the potential of the
blockchain technology for IP and innovation, and offered an
overview of institutional measures in favor of its acceptance
and implementation. We have shown that the blockchain
technology provided strong timestamping, proof-of-existence
as well as the potential for smart contracts and enabled the
creation of distributed, transparent, cost-effective and re-
silient environments open to all and where each transaction
is auditable. We found that when applying these character-
istics to the different IP and innovation strategies, it could
help copyrights to be enforced more effectively in the con-
text of digitization and render the patent system more ef-
ficient and less vulnerable to abuses. We also established
that blockchains can support companies wishing to keep in-
ventions secret as well as provide a reliable infrastructure
for defensive publications. The technology promises an ex-
citing impact on open innovation, where it could function
as the missing framework for prosperous cooperation and
solve ethical questions as well as organizational problems.
We showed that several institutions across the world have
started enacting laws related to blockchain technology, some
governments have begun implementing the technology in
public functions and even more currently investigate the
technology’s potential. This trend is likely to further spread
and represents an encouraging sign for the future of the
technology and its acceptance. Interviews with three ac-
tors involved in the innovation process confirmed that the
investigated benefits are perceived in practice as well.
This study is however somewhat limited by the novel
character of the technology. Even though it was introduced
almost ten years prior to the study, its application beyond
cryptocurrencies was only recognized much later, meaning
only very little research was done on the subject. While the
institutional interest in the technology and the will to foster it
is tangible, most initiatives are exploratory, and only time will
tell if they will yield the expected success. Lastly, the results
of the interviews, although promising, are not representative
of the majority.
This exploratory study opens up several questions con-
cerning the future of blockchain technology in innovation.
While blockchain technology has seen first use cases and
pilots in the patent system and for copyrights, secrecy and
defensive publication, its impact on open innovation remains
highly theoretical and needs further research on possible
mechanisms and implementations to unlock its potential.
Furthermore, the progression of acceptance will need inves-
tigation as the use cases and legislations will likely multiply
in the next few years. In particular, the concept of identity
on the blockchain is still missing from legislations but is a
central issue to IP, innovation and many other fields, and will
be a necessary step to unlock further use cases.
We deem it likely that blockchain technology will have
tremendous impacts on the way the world innovates and pro-
tects innovations. We share one of interviewee’s enthusiasm
regarding the “fantastic” potential of the technology.
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